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TO BESPEAK THE OBVIOUS: A SUBSTANTIVE
EQUALITY ANALYSIS OF REPRODUCTION
AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
DONNA M. EANSOR*
That those who bear children and benefit society as a
whole thereby should not be economically or socially dis-
advantaged seems to bespeak the obvious. It is only
women who bear children; no man can become
pregnant .... 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Women conceive and bear children. Men do not. This
biological ability to conceive, a characteristic shared by all
women, is the basis upon which many theorists and a large part
of society have concluded that a woman's traditional role is first
and foremost that of a primary caregiver. It is from this biolog-
ical determinism that attitudes and stereotypes that preclude
women from equal treatment in society have sprung. Society
has nurtured and maintained these sex characterization stereo-
types; the law first sanctioned, then solidified, their social
entrenchment. The assumption that a woman's primary role in
society is to be a caregiver is the basis of the nature theory and
it is upon this theory that many political theorists and our
courts continue to support the denial of full social justice to
women.2 Underlying the nature theory is the premise that
women have a natural desire or need for children which men
lack.' The nature theory also espouses that when a woman
* Assistant Professor and Associate Dean of Law, University of
Windsor.
1. Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, 1243 (1989)
(Can).
2. I am using the term "social justice" to include all of the rights
normally enjoyed with full citizenship in the state, including political,
employment, and legal rights. See generally ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF
THE AMERICAN MIND: How HIGHER EDUCATION HAS FAILED DEMOCRACY AND
IMPOVERISHED THE SOUL OF TODAY'S STUDENTS (1987). Bloom relies heavily
on Rousseau's idealized picture of family life where women were without full
societal protection and participation. Full protection and participation were
not necessary because women were fully protected and sheltered by their
husbands' love and protection.
3. See S. MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 35 (1989).
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chooses to satisfy this innate desire and need, she does so vol-
untarily. Therefore, any burdens under the law, or any bur-
dens flowing from conflicts arising between family and paid
workplace responsibilities must be borne by the woman. Thus,
from this voluntary choice flows the rationale for, and the justi-
fication of, the denial of full social justice to women.
Society's view of women as transient members of the paid
workplace stems from this theory. That is, women secure jobs
in the paid workplace, only to leave them upon becoming preg-
nant. From this assumption, grew the unacceptance of preg-
nancy in the paid workplace. In recent past history, the law
provided for mandatory departure from the paid workplace
early in pregnancy.4 Other types of protectionist legislation
and employer policies have been justified on the basis that bio-
logical and maternal functions make certain types of work or
work practice, unsuitable for women. Legislation which limited
the hours in which women could work5 or which exclude
women from military service or contact sports 6 are examples of
sex characterization stereotypes at work.
Although many laws of this type have been challenged and
set aside by the courts, the repeal of these laws did not quash
the sex stereotypes upon which they were based-sex stereo-
types continue to affect employers' policies and the law,
restricting women's access to social justice.7 This is so even
though statistically a woman's level of commitment to paid
4. Employer policies and laws allowing employers to arbitrarily require
women to leave the workplace have been held unconstitutional under the due
process clause. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)
(involving school board policies that required pregnant teachers at an early
point in their pregnancy to leave the workplace and take mandatory maternity
leaves).
5. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). This case dealt with a law
that limited the hours that women could work. The Court found that such
protection of women was needed: "[H]er physical structure and a proper
discharge of her maternal functions-having in view not merely her own
health, but the well-being of the race-justify legislation to protect her from
the greed as well as the passion of man .. " Id. at 421-22.
6. In the United States women are still excluded from these activities.
See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); 7 C.F.R. 15a.41(b) (1991);
10 C.F.R. 1040.44(b) (1991); 34 C.F.R. 106.41(b) (1991); 45 C.F.R. 86.41(b)
(1991).
7. A recent example is the appellate decision in UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). If
these policies had remained unchallenged, it was estimated that 20 million
jobs would have been unavailable to women. See id. at 914.
In Canada, fetal protection policies are discriminatory in most
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1980, ch. 53,
§ 9(2); Weins v. Inco Metals Co., 9 C.H.R.R. D4795 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry
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work is no longer contingent upon whether or not she has chil-
dren. Women are not staying at home with children in the
1990's; many return to the paid workplace soon after the birth
of a child.8
Judicial and employer decisions are also influenced by the
stereotypical belief that women are secondary wage earners,
individuals that do not have to work for financial reasons. 9 Fur-
thermore, the belief that women are incapable of making
independent well-reasoned decisions impacts upon judicial
determinations.
Discrimination cases dealing with reproduction and
employment have been influenced by biological determinism
and stereotypical myths about a woman's participation in the
paid labour force. These cases clearly illustrate the manner in
which judges have been guided by the nature theory and stere-
1988) (Can.). The Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981, § 23(2), supra, provides
for a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
This issue has also arisen in Canada under child welfare legislation.
Some lower courts have ordered the taking into custody of the fetus to
prevent abuse by the mother. Of course, to take a fetus into custody, the
mother must be taken into custody as well. This raises questions of informed
consent and personal integrity. See Re Brown, 21 R.F.L. 315 (Ont. Co. Ct.
1976) (Can.); Children's Aid Soc'y of the City of Belleville, 59 O.R. 2d 204
(1987) (Can.). Contra Re Baby R, No. A872582 (B.C.S.C. 1988) (Can.); In re F
(In Utero), [1988] W.L.R. 1288 (C.A. 1988) (Can.).
8. Over 50% of all working women in Canada have pre-school aged
children. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA, LABOUR
CANADA, WOMEN IN THE LABOUR FORCE: 1986-87, at 19-20 [hereinafter
WOMEN'S BUREAU]. Of these women, 69% of them are employed full time.
See STATISTICS CANADA, LABOUR FORCE (1985) (Table 4 1A). Working mothers
represent 60% of all working women in the United States. See H.R. REP. No.
353, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988). Forty percent of these women have
children under one year of age. See Klein, Caregiving Arrangements by Employed
Women with Children Under I Year of Age 21 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 398, 403-
06 (1985).
These percentages promise only to rise significantly in years to come.
Single women between the ages of 25-34 make up the largest group of labour
participating women in Canada with a participation rate of 85%. These are
the women most likely to become pregnant during their working lives. See
WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 8, at 19-20. In the United States, 80% of
women in the labour force will become pregnant during their working lives;
over 50% will return to the workplace within one year of childbirth. See Family
and Medical Leave Act; Hearing on H. R. 925 Before the House Committee on Small
Business, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of
Linda Dorian, Executive Director of Business and Professional Women's
Clubs).
9. In the United States, 50% of the poor and three-fifths of chronically
poor households with children are maintained by women who are single
parents. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT EARNINGS (1987).
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otypical attitudes about women when reproduction is at issue.
Judicial reliance upon these beliefs has resulted in the limita-
tion of women's employment rights on the basis of reproduc-
tive capacity.
Biological determinism is entrenched into the law in vari-
ous ways, however, one of the most effective ways is through
the adoption and application of a formal model of equality to
issues involving reproduction. The link between biological
determinism and the formal equality approach is explained in
Part II of this article. This part also contains a description and
comparison of formal and substantive equality.
In Part III and IV, this article looks at the application of
both a formal and substantive model of equality to cases deal-
ing with reproduction and paid employment opportunities'0
under discrimination laws in Canada" and in the United
States. 12
10. I use the terms "paid employment," "paid workplace," "paid
work," and "paid labour" throughout the discussion to note the distinction
between work in the public employment sector and work in the private home
sector.
11. The examination of discrimination law in this paper is limited to
human rights legislation in Canada. In Canada, section 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Charter], deals
with equality and discrimination. It has been judicially decided that the
Charter will not apply to private actions. See Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C.,
[1989 1 S.C.R. 143 (1989) (Can.) For a discussion of the way in which this
limitation on section 15 restricts the potential achievement of substantive
equality for women in private spheres activities, see GWEN BRODSKY &
SHELAGH DAY, CANADIAN CHARTER EQUALITY RIGHTS FOR WOMEN: ONE STEP
FORWARD OR Two STEPS BACK? 208 (1989).
That is not to say that discrimination law does not influence section 15
cases and vice versa. See, e.g., Ontario Human Rights Comm'n v. Simpson-
Sears & O'Malley, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (1985) (Can.), cited in Andrews v. Law
Soc'y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (1989) (Can.); Brooks v. Canada Safeway
Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 (1989) (Can.).
12. The examination of discrimination law in this paper is limited to
Title VII cases. Discrimination under constitutional law will not be covered.
In the United States, the Supreme Court, in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974), determined that laws dealing with the unique ability to conceive do
not raise an issue of equal protection of women and men. The basis for the
decision was the Court's determination that the comparable groups in these
cases were pregnant persons and non-pregnant persons, not women and
men. Of course, only women can presently become pregnant and therefore if
this reasoning is followed, the comparable groups will never raise an issue of
equal protection.
Also note that the decision makes it difficult to challenge the
constitutional validity of laws and policies where reproduction is at issue.
Since gender was defined to exclude the unique ability to conceive, the Court
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Specifically, Part III looks at the way in which the applica-
tion of a formal model of equality resulted in the judicial deter-
mination that pregnancy discrimination was not sex
discrimination. This finding facilitated the denial of certain
employment benefits to women employees who became
parents.
Part III also contains a comparison of this formalistic anal-
ysis with the analysis adopted and applied more recently by the
Supreme Courts in both jurisdictions. Both of these courts
have taken significant, although incomplete steps, away from a
formalistic analysis. The movement is attributable to a shifting
by each of the courts towards a substantive equality analysis
which rejects the nature theory and the stereotypical general-
izations which flow from the theory. The relevant cases dis-
cussed in Part III, as well as the cases discussed in Part IV,
demonstrate the way in which a substantive equality analysis
produces results which are more equitable in nature than the
results which flow from a formal equality analysis. These cases
also illustrate the way in which the courts have not fully
adopted and applied a substantive equality analysis to the
issues involved. The remedies adopted by the courts do not
applied a minimal standard of scrutiny. Under this standard, a law is
constitutional if there is any rational reason for its existence. Patent
irrationality is required for a finding of unconstitutionality and it is therefore
difficult to establish unconstitutionality.
Gender based classifications are subject to an intermediate level of
judicial scrutiny. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 342 n.3 (1980). The law
must have "a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation."
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). This level of scrutiny, if it had been
applicable, makes a successful constitutional challenge to legislation where
reproduction is at issue more probable.
The Supreme Court had another opportunity to deal with this issue in
the case of Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Industry, 479 U.S.
1050 (1987), vacating 692 P.2d 1243 (1984). In Miller-Wohl, the employer
specifically challenged Montana legislation providing preferential treatment
to pregnant employees under the equal protection clause, as well as under
the state pre-emption doctrine. The state court found that the legislation
violated the equal protection clause. The Montana Supreme Court did not
specifically make this finding. It did refer to the equal protection clause and
quoted from the lower court in finding that the legislation placed men and
women on more equal terms. See 692 P.2d at 1254 (quoting Miller-Wohl, 515
F. Supp. 1264, 1266 (D. Mont. 1981)). However, the U.S. Supreme Court
never decided the equal protection issue. The Court remanded Miller-Wohl
in light of the finding in the case of California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). This remand was significant. The Supreme
Court did not deal with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment in Guerra. The decision involved only the issue of state pre-
emption which was also before the Court in Miller-Wohl.
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necessarily guarantee equality of condition. Specifically, these
decisions do not guarantee economic equality.
Part IV of the article looks at the way in which a woman's
right to certain jobs in a toxic workplace is denied. This is
achieved through fetal protection policies which exclude fertile
women from performing certain jobs. The 1991 United States
Supreme Court decision in UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc. " found
this type of policy discriminatory on the basis of sex and preg-
nancy. In so holding, the Justices overturned the appellate
court which had found that the polices were discriminatory but
justifiable.
The appellate and Supreme Court decisions in UA W v.
Johnson Controls, Inc. provide a comparative framework to illus-
trate the way in which a substantive equality analysis produces
more equitable results than a formalistic analysis in cases which
involve reproduction issues. A comparative analysis of these
decisions also illustrates the manner in which stereotypical atti-
tudes directly impact upon the interpretation and application
of laws and standards.
II. BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND Two THEORIES
OF EQUALITY
Formal equality entrenches biological determinism into
the law and thus perpetuates stereotypes about women, paid
work, and reproduction, because it requires only that the law
treat men and women the same. Biological difference is not
acknowledged. Under the formal equality analysis, women are
guaranteed equality only when they are identically situated to
men. In situations where the sexes are not identically situated,
as in any case where the ability to conceive is a factor, same or
identical treatment does not result in equality of condition.
13. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). Three judgments were issued by the Court.
The majority of the Court, Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor
and Souter, held that the fetal protection policy was direct sex discrimination
which the employer could justify only by establishing that the policy was a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). They further held that such a
policy could not be justified as a BFOQ. Id. at 1199-210. Concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, Justice White, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy agreed that the policy was direct sex discrimination which
could be justified only if the employer established that it was BFOQ. They
agreed that Johnson Controls had not established that the policy was a
BFOQ. However, they disagreed with the majority finding that a BFOQ
could never be established to justify such a policy. Id. at 1210-16. Justice
Scalia concurs in the judgment but writes separately largely to disagree with
some of the comments by the majority about the scope of the BFOQ. Id. at
1216-17.
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The absence of a male analogue in cases involving issues of
gender has proven detrimental to women.
Claims arising from systemic discrimination also serve to
illustrate the conundrum. Under a formalistic analysis, dis-
crimination is defined narrowly, covering only intentional dis-
crimination. Laws which are gender neutral pass this simple
test. No attempt is made to look behind a particular policy or
law to determine whether it in fact has an adverse impact upon
a particular group.
A formal theorist would not disagree with these conclu-
sions and in fact would agree that the idea that women are bio-
logically different and thus inferior to other members of
society, is in fact the catalysis of the unequal societal state of
women. However, recognition of biological difference is dis-
couraged on the basis that it is not necessary to achieve equal-
ity. Equality is reached eventually through market forces.
Moreover, acknowledging biological difference requires that
women be distinguished from men in this respect and a formal
equality theorist maintains that any differential or special treat-
ment of women reinforces the view that women are inferior to
men.
Reaching equality through market forces seems unlikely
because the failure by the courts to recognize biological differ-
ence has in fact reinforced the view that women are validly
treated as unequal participants in a just society. In cases about
reproduction and equal employment rights, disregard for the
biological distinction between men and women, that is the abil-
ity to conceive, has resulted in the limitation of women's
employment rights. This result is reached through the adop-
tion of a narrow definition of gender which excludes the ability
to become pregnant. Once excluded however, the ability is not
ignored. It is employed as a "valid" basis upon which to distin-
guish women from men and thus exclude women from employ-
ment opportunities and benefits that they would have
otherwise been entitled to had they not had the capacity to
become pregnant. ' 4
14. In the United States: See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976). This case involved a complaint of sex discrimination under Title VII
about an employer's policy that provided temporary disability benefits for all
employees except those individuals temporarily disabled due to pregnancy.
In reaching the decision that the policy did not discriminate, the Court relied
upon the constitutional decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
In Canada: See Bliss v. Attorney Gen. of Can., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183
(1978) (Can.). In Bliss, the question before the Court was the entitlement of a
pregnant woman to unemployment insurance benefits. Bliss did not get any
1992]
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A substantive equality analysis of these issues produces a
different result. Equality under this analysis means "equality in
the substance of one's condition."' 5 This theory of equality
finds its roots in a broad definition of discrimination. Such a
definition of discrimination has been adopted by the Supreme
Court of Canada in two recent decisions:
[D]iscrimination may be described as a distinction,
whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating
to personal characteristics of the individual or group,
which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or
disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed
upon others, or which withholds or limits access to
opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other
members of society. Distinctions based on personal char-
acteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis
of association with a group will rarely escape the charge
of discrimination, while those based on an individual's
merits and capabilities will rarely be so classed. 6
This definition of discrimination clearly prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of personal characteristics. A personal and
shared characteristic of women is the unique ability to con-
ceive.17 Therefore, limiting women's rights because of this abil-
ity is discrimination.
In addition gender is defined much differently under sub-
stantive equality analysis. It is broadly defined to include, not
exclude, the ability to conceive. A particular law or standard
which distinguishes on this basis will automatically violate anti-
discrimination law. Under this analysis, employment rights
cannot be validly limited by reproductive capacity.
This type of analysis does not reinforce the belief that
women are reproductively inferior to men. Acknowledging
that women are biologically different than men, is not the same
as advocating that they are in fact inferior in this respect, or
benefits because she did not qualify for maternity benefits and she was
refused benefits under the regular scheme because she was pregnant. She
challenged the Unemployment Insurance Act on the basis of sex
discrimination and claimed a violation of her right to equal protection of the
law under section 1 (b) of the Canadian Bill Of Rights, S.C. 1960, ch. 44,
reprinted in R.S.C. 1970, app. 111 (Can.). The Supreme Court found that her
equality rights had not been violated because the definition of 'equality' did
not extend to the entitlement of benefits.
15. BRODSKY & DAY, supra note 11, at 147.
16. See Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 (1989)
(Can.); Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 173-75 (1989)
(Can.).
17. Brooks, 1 S.C.R. at 1244.
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that they should enjoy a lesser status in society because of this
difference. Accounting for the difference in the determination
of whether or not a law or standard discriminates on the basis
of sex ensures that the reproductive capacity of women is not
utilized to justify discrimination. This safeguard in turn
ensures that women as a group are not discriminated against
because of this unique component of their gender.
Moreover, substantive equality analysis emphasizes that it
is the societal treatment of women as biologically different,
rather than the biological difference itself which is at the root of
the denial of social justice for women. In this respect, a sub-
stantive equality analysis rejects the nature theory and the ster-
eotypical attitudes which flow from it.
However, substantive equality cannot be guaranteed by a
finding of discrimination alone. True equality is only attained
if the remedy fashioned to redress the discrimination results in
equality of condition for the group under consideration. In
other words, it is not enough to formulate and interpret laws
using this analysis if the remedy devised by the court does not
result in actual equality of condition. Equality of condition in
cases involving reproduction can be reached only if the unique
ability to conceive is considered by the court when it is formu-
lating the appropriate remedy to redress the discrimination.
The determination of whether a particular group is in fact
equal in condition can be made through a comparative analysis
which contrasts the condition of the subject group with the
condition of the appropriate comparative group in society.' 8
This type of analysis also considers the 'disadvantage' status of
18. Andrews, 1 S.C.R. at 164-65, 168-69. This constitutional case
specifically rejected a formal model of equality. Andrews decided the question
of whether a British Columbia statute which restricted admission to the Bar
of British Columbia on the basis of Canadian citizenship violated section 15
of the Charter. The decision of the court was that the Canadian citizenship
requirement violated section 15 of the Charter and that it was not a justifiable
limit under section 1 of the Charter. Six justices decided the case; three
judgments were issued by McIntyre, LaForest and Wilson. All six justices
agreed with Justice McIntyre about the interpretation of section 15; Justice
LaForest wrote separately but stated that he was in agreement with Justice
McIntyre's analysis of section 15. Justice McIntyre and Lamer formed the
minority on section 1 finding that the requirement was a justifiable limit
under section 1. Justice Wilson wrote separately on section 1 and it is her
judgment that resulted in the majority outcome about section 1; that is that
the requirement could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter. Chief
Justice Dickson, L'Heureux-Dube, and LaForest concurred with Justice
Wilson.
Brooks adopts the equality analysis described in the text but does not
explicitly set the analysis out in its judgment. See Brooks, 1 S.C.R. at 1219.
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the subject group in our society.' 9 This latter step is necessary
to ensure that the condition of the subject group is equalized in
the sense that it is made the same as the condition of the
advantaged comparable group. This equalization is a recog-
nized purpose of anti-discrimination law.2 0
Discrimination cases involving issues of equal employment
and reproduction in both Canada and the United States illus-
trate that the adoption and application of a substantive model
of equality to such cases produce results which are more equi-
table in nature. The application of a formal model of equality
to these issues results in the limitation of employment rights on
the basis of reproductive capacity. Part III and Part IV of this
article demonstrate the distinct results of the two approaches.
III. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND Two THEORIES
OF EQUALITY
In the not so distant past, the Supreme Courts of Canada
and the United States maintained that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy, or the ability to become pregnant, was not
sex discrimination. The decisions in Gilbert and Bliss were a
product of the application of a formal model of equality to
issues about reproduction and employment. Generally speak-
ing, gender was narrowly defined to exclude the ability to con-
ceive. However, despite its exclusion from the definition of
gender, the ability was not disregarded. In the next step of the
analysis, biological difference was employed as a valid basis
upon which to distinguish women from other employees and
thus, disentitle them to employment benefits that they would
have otherwise been entitled to, had they not been pregnant.
Equal employment opportunities did not follow where repro-
duction was at issue; they were limited, and justifiably it was
19. In a brief discussion in which the court attempts to define the types
of distinctions that will violate section 15, Mr. Justice McIntyre refers to
"those which involve prejudice or disadvantage .. " Andrews, 1 S.C.R. at
181. He also quotes Judge Hugession in Smith, Kline & French Lab. v.
Attorney Gen. of Can., [ 1987] 2 F.C. 359, 369 (1987) (Can.). "Questions of
stereotyping, or historical disadvantagement, in a word, of prejudice, are the
focus... [of section 15 of the Charter]." Id. at 180.
In a separate judgment, Madame Justice Wilson also discusses the
meaning of section 15, stating that it was "designed to protect those groups
who suffer social, political, and legal disadvantage in our society .. " Id. at
154. Referring specifically to the case before the court, Justice Wilson states
that non-citizens are "a group lacking in political power and as such
vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and their rights to equal
concern and respect violated. Id. at 152.
20. Id. at 173.
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argued, because of the biological difference of women from
men. Under this formalistic analysis, no independent access to
the law is available to women when reproduction is an issue-
juridical claims arise only when a women can demonstrate that
a male analogue exists. Because men cannot become pregnant,
no analogue can be established. Women are therefore unable
to establish a valid legal claim to full employment rights in
cases that involve laws or policies that distinguish women from
other employees on this basis.
A substantive equality interpretation of issues of equality
and reproduction produce a dramatically different result. The
1989 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Brooks v. Canada
Safeway Ltd.21 and the 1987 United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra22
illustrate this difference.
A. Substantive Equality in Canada
Following Bliss, many provinces moved to enact human
rights legislation which provided that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy was discrimination on the basis of sex.
23
However, before the Manitoba legislature did so, the applica-
tions were launched in the Brooks case. The appellate court in
Brooks,24 relying on Bliss, found that an employer's accident and
sickness plan (which exempted pregnant women from benefits
during a seventeen week period) did not discriminate on the
basis of sex. The Supreme Court disagreed and in so doing,
21. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 (1989). This unanimous decision brings the
Canadian Supreme Court into line with many human rights laws which
specifically prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. This
includes the Manitoba legislation, which did not contain such a provision
when the action was launched. It only contained a provision which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex. See Canadian Human Rights
Act, S.C. 1976-77, ch. 33, amended by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, ch. 143, § 2 (Can.);
The Individual's Rights Protection Act, S.A. 1972, ch. 2, amended by S.A. 1980,
c. 27, § 27 (Alberta); Human Rights Code, R.S.S. 1979, ch. S-24.1, § 2(o)
(Saskatchewan); Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, S.Q 1975, ch. 6,
amended by S.Q. 1982, ch. 61 (Quebec); Human Rights Code, S.O. 1981, ch.
53, amended by 1986, ch. 64, § 18(7) (Ontario); Human Rights Act, S.M. 1974,
ch. 65, amended by 1987, ch. 45, § 9(2) (Manitoba).
Additionally, the case overrules Bliss v. Attorney Gen. of Can., [1979] 1
S.C.R. 183 (1979) (Can.), and specifically refuses to follow Geduldig v. Aiello,
417 U.S. 484 (1974), and General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
22. 479 U.S. 272 (1987). Of course, this is a matter of interpretation.
The holding in Guerra can be construed very narrowly: State laws providing
preferential treatment for pregnancy are not pre-empted by Title VII.
23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24. 42 Man. R.2d 27 (1986).
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specifically rejected a substantial portion of the formal equality
analysis employed by the Canadian and the U.S. Supreme
Courts in Bliss and Gilbert respectively.25
The Canadian Supreme Court held that pregnancy dis-
crimination is in fact sex discrimination. The reasoning behind
the decision transcends a simple reliance by the court upon the
then existing legislation which confirmed this finding. In
acknowledging that the legal rights of women cannot be deter-
mined without recognizing biological difference, the Court
provides a framework in which to assess issues that involve this
difference. The analysis consists of the examination of the
impact of the law or policy on the condition of the individual or
group affected by the law or policy. A law or policy which dis-
criminatorily impacts upon the condition of the individual or
group will be in violation of the law.
The condition of an individual or group consists of two
components, both of which are derived from the broad defini-
tion of discrimination discussed earlier. This definition
describes discrimination as a "distinction... based on grounds
relating to personal characteristics of the . .. group."26 The
first component then, in the determination of condition, is the
identification of the personal characteristics of the group at
issue. The Brooks court identified the unique ability to conceive
as a personal biological shared characteristic of women. Gen-
der is thus broadly defined to include the unique ability to con-
ceive. As a personal characteristic, the ability is not excluded,
as it was under a formal analysis, from the consideration of
whether a law or policy distinguishes on the basis of sex.
Rather, it is included in the determination of whether the pol-
icy or law in fact so distinguishes.
The second component of the condition of a group
involves a comparative analysis-the condition of the subject
group in society is compared with the condition of others in
society. Under this comparative analysis, the 'disadvantaged'
status of the group in society is also relevant. If a law or policy
distinguishes on the basis of these personal characteristics and
has the "effect of imposing burdens, obligation or disadvan-
tages" on the group possessing those characteristics, the law or
policy will be discriminatory. '"27
25. See supra note 14.
26. Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, 1227 (1989)
(Can.).
27. Id. at 1229.
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In Brooks, the disability policy was found to be discrimina-
tory because it distinguished between pregnant women and
other employees who also left the paid work place temporarily
because of a health related reason. The distinction, that is the
unavailability of benefits to pregnant women for seventeen
weeks, disadvantaged women by imposing upon them a dispro-
portionate economic burden or obligation for becoming a par-
ent. As a result, the actual condition of women was different
than the actual condition of other employees who were
required to leave the workplace temporarily for a health-
related reason.
The economic burden on women is disproportionate
because the balance of society, including the employer in this
case, is not contributing to the cost of procreation. Societal
contribution is justified because procreation is a societal benefit
to which all members of society should economically contrib-
ute. To hold otherwise, as the court points out, would be con-
trary to the "purposes of anti-discrimination legislation"
because such a holding would sanction "one of the most signif-
icant ways in which women have been disadvantaged in our
society." 28
Implicit in this decision is the determination that the right
to equal employment opportunities and the right to procre-
ate 29 are equal. The court precludes any other analysis because
28. Brooks, 1 S.C.R. at 1238. The Brooks court acknowledged that the
disadvantaged status of women in society is primarily due to the societal
treatment of a woman's role in the procreative cycle. The court identified the
historical treatment of pregnancy in society and under the law as the reason
for the disadvantaged status of women in society. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of
B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (1989), was not a gender equality case, but the case
contains a point that makes it possible for this same conclusion to be reached
in section 15 cases. This point arises in the context of the very vague
definition of "disadvantage" which is included in the judgment. Although
the court provides virtually no guidance about which groups the court will
classify as being in this category, it does refer to groups in our society that
have been historically disadvantaged. Clearly, women have been historically
disadvantaged in our society; they are poor, vulnerable to domination
(especially if married and responsible for children) and, unlike men, more
frequently the victims of abuse, brutalization, and past discrimination. In
Canada, 56.4% of all low-income persons between the ages of 16 and 64 are
women. 55.3% of women who are single parents are poor. See ONTARIO
WOMEN'S DIRECTORATE 1 (1988) (quoting THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
WELFARE, POVERTY PROFILE (1988)).
29. The Brooks court proceeded on the basis that a right to procreate
does exist at law. Safeway argued that the state of pregnancy did not amount
to sex discrimination. To support this argument they drew an analogy
between the state of pregnancy and the process of growing a beard. The
basis for the analogy lay in an earlier Manitoba Court of Appeal decision that
1992]
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they find that the ability to conceive cannot be used as a differ-
ential distinction to justify the limiting of women's employment
rights. Therefore, the limitation of employment rights where
reproduction is at issue, the accepted practice by the courts
before Brooks, is found to be discriminatory.
In addition to outlining a substantive equality framework
in which to assess issues about reproduction and paid work, the
Brooks court also identified and set aside some of the stereotypi-
cal underpinnings of a formalistic analysis. The Justices were
clear that it is the societal treatment of women as biologically
different rather than biological difference itself which has
resulted in the continuing unequal status of women in our soci-
ety. The nature theory is expressly discounted by the Justices;
they reject the employer's argument that pregnancy is a volun-
tary state and they overrule Bliss.3°
The court rejected the stereotypical view that becoming
pregnant is simply a voluntary choice by a woman. 3' The
employer in Brooks argued that the choice was voluntary and
therefore was like other voluntary absences from the paid
workplace which were not covered by the policy. Relating the
issue of voluntariness to the question of whether pregnancy is
an accident or an illness, the Court held that it is neither an
accident nor an illness but that it is a "valid health-related rea-
son for absence from the workplace."3 2 In coming to this con-
clusion, the court looked closely at the function of
reproduction in society:
It seems indisputable that in our society pregnancy is a
valid health-related reason for being absent from work.
It is to state the obvious to say that pregnancy is of funda-
mental importance in our society. Indeed, its importance
makes description difficult .... If the medical condition
associated with procreation does not provide a legitimate
reason for absence from the workplace, it is hard to imag-
ine what would provide such a reason...."
held that a "no beards" rule was not a matter of sexual discrimination. (i.e.,
beards are peculiar to men and pregnancy is peculiar to women). See Canada
Safeway Ltd. v. Manitoba Food and Commercial Worker's Union, Local 832,
[1981] 2 S.C.R. 180 (1981). ChiefJustice Dickson rejects this argument and
states, "The attempt to draw an analogy at best trivializes the procreative and
socially vital function of women and seeks to elevate the growing of facial hair
to a constitutional right... " Brooks, 1 S.C.R. at 1250.
30. Brooks, 1 S.C.R. at 1244.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
32. Brooks, 1 S.C.R. at 1237.
33. Id.
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An even clearer rejection of the nature theory is the
Court's disposition of the Bliss decision. Bliss dealt with the
question of Bliss' entitlement to unemployment insurance ben-
efits because she was pregnant. Bliss did not qualify for mater-
nity benefits and she was refused benefits under the regular
scheme because she was pregnant. The Supreme Court, inter-
preting Section 1 (b) of the Bill of Rights, found that her equality
rights had not been violated because 'equality' did not extend
to the entitlement of benefits. Overruling Bliss, Chief Justice
Dickson stated: "It is difficult to accept that the inequality to
which Stella Bliss was subject was created by nature and there-
fore there was no discrimination; the better view, I now venture
to think, is that the inequality was created by legislation ....
This is a clear statement by the Supreme Court that the ful-
crum of gender equality lies in perceptions about biological dif-
ference and their codification in the law in contradistinction to
biological differences themselves.
In addition to persuasively rejecting the nature theory,
Brooks provides a well developed substantive equality frame-
work in which to assess issues about reproduction and paid
work. Providing this framework is a significant step towards
the realization of equality of condition for women in society.
The decision, however, is not completely consistent with a sub-
stantive equality analysis. The economic impact of the decision
on the women involved, is arguably, inconsistent with such an
analysis.
The decision entitled Safeway's pregnant employees to
employer disability funds for seventeen weeks. These funds
provided the women with some income to replace lost earn-
ings. However, employer disability funds do not provide for
complete income replacement and, even though Unemploy-
ment Insurance Benefits are also available, total income
replacement is an exception, not the rule. It is for this reason,
that the remedy devised in Brooks is only consistent with a sub-
stantive equality analysis if one accepts that women employees
should bear this economic loss.
A substantive equality theorist would not support such an
approach. Treating pregnancy as a disability does not ade-
quately deal with the economic realities faced by women who
become parents. Requiring women to bear the majority of the
cost of reproduction results in economic penalization. There-
fore, women suffer inequality of condition because they. remain
economically penalized. Partial income replacement provided
34. Id. at 1244.
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by the employer or the state simply lessens the degree of the
penalization.
Penalization would not occur if the funds provided by the
employer, in addition to funds provided by the state, in the
form of unemployment insurance and parental benefits, com-
pletely compensated for the income loss suffered by a woman
when she is out of the paid workplace because of child bearing
and child rearing responsibilities.3 5
Providing for full income replacement through the joint
contribution of the state and the employer can also be justified
on the basis that any lesser amount is contrary to the purposes
35. In the United States, some women are not entitled to any income
replacement because their employers and/or the state in which they live do
not provide any benefits through disability or unemployment insurance
schemes.
About 40% of working mothers are entitled to employer-provided paid
leave, which is normally funded through disability insurance. Hearing, supra
note 8, at 50, 117 (GAO report on cost estimates of H.R. 925).
Sixty percent of working women are entitled to unpaid employer-
provided leave. See id. at 50 (statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder). A
significant percentage of employers do not provide sufficient leaves of
absence for pregnant employees, income replacement during leave, and job
security. Women employed in larger companies are more likely to receive
fair treatment than women employed in small and medium size companies.
Unfortunately, women are disproportionately employed in smaller
companies and there are more small companies than large companies across
the United States. In Michigan, for example, 76% of the state's employers
employ less than 10 employees and 88% of the state's employers employ less
than 20 employees. See id. at 103.
A study on small and medium firms conducted in 1981, which covered
100 small and medium sized firms, reported that 88% of the companies
provided maternity leave, but less than 44% of the companies provided paid
disability leave for the six to eight week recovery period. See id. at 254.
Seventy-two percent of these companies guaranteed job security and
seniority.
State funded income replacement in the form of unemployment
insurance, is available in all but 14 states. These 14 states are Florida,
Indiana, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Many of these states deny unemployment insurance to pregnant
employees on the basis that the woman has left work for a reason not
attributable to the employer. For example, in Michigan, the Michigan
Employment Security Act, MICH. COMp. LAws § 421.29 (1990), provides:
"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits in all cases in which [the
individual]: (a) Has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to
the employer or employing unit." In Watson v. Murdock's Food and Wet
Goods, 385 N.W.2d 693 (Mich. App. 1986), the court denied a women
unemployment insurance upon leaving work due to pregnancy complications.
The court held that pregnancy constituted a "good cause" for leaving work
but that it was not attributable to the employer.
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of anti-discrimination law. That purpose is twofold, the elimi-
nation of discriminatory practices and the equalization of those
groups which have been historically disadvantaged in our soci-
ety because of such practices. Anything less than full income
replacement perpetuates the disadvantaged status of women
because they remain economically unequal when they
procreate.3 6
B. Substantive Equality in the United States
A similar move towards the adoption and application of a
substantive equality approach in cases about reproduction and
paid work has also taken place in the United States. Although
the Supreme Court decision in Johnson Controls is the most
recent example of this trend, there is a precedential basis for
such an analysis in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(PDA)3 7 and the 1987 Supreme Court decision in California Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra.
36. I am not suggesting that the Brooks court could have ordered such a
remedy. To provide substantive equality of condition in these circumstances
requires substantial legislative changes. I am suggesting that had the court
fully considered the impact of its decision on the economic condition of the
women involved, it may have reached this conclusion. The judgment could
have reflected this.
The allocation of the burden between the employer and the state would
not be easily settled. If procreation is a societal benefit, presumably it should
be supported by all citizens. Requiring employers to contribute
disproportionately would not be acceptable on this basis. The other danger
of disproportionate contributions by employers is that it becomes more costly
to hire women. Of course, cost factors should never be allowed to excuse
discrimination, but it provides employers with the incentive to not hire
women. On the other hand, a disproportionate contribution on the part of
employers can be justified in that they receive a more direct benefit than
other members of society. Ensuring that its employees are financially secure
when they are out of the workplace, ensures content employees, and this
results in more productivity.
Providing full income replacement to women who become parents is
only a part of a larger societal question. Other groups in our society have
suffered historical disadvantage on the basis of personal characteristics and
must rely on the state unemployment insurance scheme for economic
assistance from time to time. Persons otherwise able to work, but unable to
secure a position in the paid workplace because of this disadvantage, would
seem to have the same argument. Immigrants, members of minorities,
differently abled people, and individuals from impoverished backgrounds are
examples.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). This act is an amendment to Title VII
and therefore only applies to employers having 15 employees or more by
virtue of § 2000e(b).
The PDA specifically overruled General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
1992l
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The PDA, which overruled Gilbert, provides a substantive
equality framework in which to analyze issues of discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy. The PDA states that pregnancy is an
issue of gender equality, providing that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions
is sex discrimination.
The legislative history of the PDA indicates that the draft-
ers of the Act intended to repudiate biological determinism
and introduce protections which strike at the heart of narrow
and restrictive social attitudes about biological differences.
There is clear recognition that attitudes about biological differ-
ences, in contradistinction to biological differences themselves,
are at the root of social injustice suffered by women.
[Tihe assumption that women will become pregnant and
leave the labour market is at the core of the sex stere-
otyping resulting in unfavourable disparate treatment of
women in the workplace. A failure to address discrimina-
tion based on pregnancy, in fringe benefits or in any
other employment practice, would prevent the elimina-
tion of sex discrimination in employment."8
Unfortunately, this view was not readily accepted, and the for-
mal versus substantive equality debate erupted over the actual
language of the PDA.
The Act states that pregnant women and women affected
by pregnancy and childbirth be treated the same (for all
employment-related purposes) as other individuals not able to
work.39 The use of the terminology 'same treatment' fueled
the debate centered on a clear difference of opinion about what
'equality' meant: did the PDA guarantee a formal model or a
substantive model of equality? In my opinion, the intent of the
PDA is to guarantee substantive equality and arguably, the
1987 decision of the Supreme Court in Guerra40 supports this
conclusion.
The Court in Guerra decided that state laws that provide
preferential treatment, in the form of leave and reinstatement
rights for pregnant women, are not pre-empted by Title VII
125 (1976), and it can be argued that it impliedly repudiated the reasoning of
the Court in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), as well.
38. See S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977).
39. Many states have discrimination legislation modeled on Title VII.
For example, in Michigan, the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP.
LAws §§ 37.2201, 2201(d), 37.2202 (1990), contains similar language which
has been judicially interpreted in a manner consistent with Title VII. See
MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 37.2201, 2201(d) (1990).
40. Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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because their purpose, that is to achieve equality between
women and men, is consistent with the purposes of Title VII.
The decision does not contain a clear outline of a substantive
equality framework, nor does it include a broad description of
discrimination4 ' for use by future decisionmakers. The inter-
pretation of the words "same treatment" however, is consistent
with a substantive equality analysis. Formal equality is rejected
through the determination that gender neutral laws are insuffi-
cient to ensure employment opportunities for women.
"Same" is defined by the Court to mean something other
than identical or equal treatment to men in all cases. Biological
difference is in fact recognized and accounted for through pref-
erential legislation. This accountability supports a broad defi-
nition of gender which includes the ability to conceive.
Moreover, the ability to conceive is considered as a unique
characteristic of women which demands independent recogni-
tion-it is not viewed as a valid differential distinction to justify
the exclusion of women from employment opportunities.
The basic premise underlying the Court's analysis is that
the intent of the PDA is to guarantee women a place in the paid
workplace without having to choose between the equally valid
right to procreate: "The purpose of Title VII is 'to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favour an identifiable group of...
employees over other employees." 42 Consistent with a sub-
41. To ensure that substantive equality is tangible, the definition of
"discrimination" under the equal protection clause must be broadened to
include systemic discrimination. The failure by the Court to recognize the
impact of systemic discrimination on the condition of women is fatal to the
realization of equality for women. Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484, held that only
those laws resulting in intentional discrimination against women constitute
gender based questions: systemic discrimination is not protected. This
finding precludes the availability of an examination of the impact of the law
on an individual, an examination of the actual condition of the individual is
thereby also precluded.
With respect to pregnancy, a narrow definition of discrimination is also
used. The Guerra Court had the opportunity to broaden the definition of
discrimination to include systemic discrimination. The Court could have
applied the disparate impact theory set out in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 410
U.S. 424 (1971), to the gender-neutral disability policy in issue. Because
pregnancy has a disparate impact on women, a neutral policy would be sex
discrimination and would therefore violate the PDA. This finding by the
Court would have broadened the definition of discrimination to include
systemic discrimination. Unfortunately, the Guerra Court specifically declined
to deal with this issue. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 279 n.32.
42. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 288 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 410
U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
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stantive concept of equality, Guerra acknowledges both the
right to equal employment opportunities and the right to pro-
create. Employment rights are not restricted by reproductive
ones. This is an important point to establish if a substantive
equality framework is to develop. However, like Brooks, the
remedy in this case is inconsistent with a substantive equality
analysis because it falls short of ensuring equality of condition
for women across the United States with respect to the employ-
ment rights at issue.
The decision does not require states to create legislation
(providing for leave and reinstatement) which addresses the
particular needs of women who become parents.43 The result
is selective justice for women across the United States because
not all states have enacted similar legislation. Therefore, a
woman living in a state without such legislation must look to
her employer for leave and reinstatement rights. Provision of
these benefits by employers is not uniform and some employ-
ers do not provide for either of the benefits. As a result, these
women may lose their jobs completely or be required to per-
form a new job which may not pay as much as, or not provide
comparable benefits to, the job which they left temporarily.
The economic loss is obvious.
43. State laws provide for reinstatement following a leave from the
work-place. However, most state laws contain two exceptions to this right: 1.
business necessity and 2. changed circumstances. Many employees, such as
the employee in Guerra, are not reinstated because of one or both of these
restrictions. The Guerra decision has been instrumental in the enactment of
legislation which specifically addresses the particular needs of women who
become parents. This legislation provides for leave and other benefits for
pregnant women. At least 17 states have enacted legislation which deals with
pregnancy and the birth of a child. Of these 17, 11 have enacted legislation
which is substantially similar to the California legislation scrutinized by the
Guerra Court. These provisions provide for a leave varying from six weeks to
a "reasonable" period of time for actual disability and also for reinstatement
rights. By restricting preferential treatment to medical disability and job
reinstatement, these laws seem unchallengeable under the pre-emption
standard set out in the case.
Six other states provide leave for pregnant employees and four of these
states provide for parental leave as well. To the extent that these provisions
provide for childrearing leave and apply only to women, they are
challengeable under Title VII and the Guerra doctrine. The six states that do
not limit leave to disability are Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin provide for paternity leave.
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C. Summary of Canadian and American Approaches
to Pregnancy Discrimination
Both Brooks and Guerra demonstrate that a formal equality
analysis perpetuates the existing unequal condition of women
in society. Each of the Courts move away from this analysis
towards the development of a substantive equality analysis for
application to cases about reproduction and employment. Spe-
cifically, the Brooks court develops a framework in which to ana-
lyze issues about reproduction from a substantive equality
point of view. This framework, which rejects the nature theory
and stereotypical assumptions about women, paid work, and
reproduction, provides a strong starting point for dealing with
the roots of gender inequality.
Similarly, in Guerra, the Court's interpretation of the PDA
from a substantive equality perspective is a significant step
towards the development of a substantive equality framework
in which cases in the United States about reproduction and
equal employment can be analyzed. However, despite Guerra,
United States courts continued to rely heavily on a formal
equality analysis and their decisions remained influenced by
the nature theory. The appellate decision in Johnson Controls is
an example of this. It is for this reason, among others, that the
Supreme Court decision injohnson Controls is the "most impor-
tant sex-discrimination case in any court since 1964." 44
IV. EMPLOYER FETAL PROTECTION POLICIES AND THE Two
THEORIES OF EQUALITY
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit inJohnson Controls is the most recent example of
the adverse consequences suffered by women because of the
application of formal equality to issues about reproduction and
employment.
In Johnson Controls, the defendant employer adopted a pol-
icy which denied women employees with childbearing capacity,
present and future access to certain jobs exposing them to
excess lead levels. The purpose of the policy was to protect
unborn children from potential bodily harm. The court found
that the medical evidence supported the argument that an
unborn child exposed to lead through his/her mother could
suffer permanent harm.45
44. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 920 (7th Cir. 1989).
45. Id. at 883.
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In a 7-4 decision, the appellate court held that the
employer's policy was not sex discrimination under Title VII.
The employer made out a case of business necessity by estab-
lishing substantial risk of harm to the unborn child and harm
resulting through exposure of a single sex, that being women,
to lead. The court found that the employees had not dis-
charged their burden of persuasion through the presentation
of specific alternatives to the policy that would be equally effec-
tive in achieving the employer's legitimate goals.
The court also held that the employer could establish a
BFOQ if required to do so, finding that the policy was directly
related to industrial safety, that such safety was part of the
essence of the employer's business and that all or substantially
all women could not safely and efficiently perform the excluded
jobs.46
As the Supreme Court points out, the decision of the
appellate court significantly varied the components of direct
and adverse discrimination. The application of established law
to these facts would have resulted in a finding that the policy
directly discriminated against women and that such discrimina-
tion was only statutorily justified if the employer established a
BFOQ.
The variation from established law is explained by the
appellate court primarily on the basis that it "balance[s] the
interests of the employer, the employee and the unborn child
in a manner consistent with Title VII." '47 The balancing of
interest approach adopted by the court is consistent with a for-
malistic analysis which views biological difference as a valid jus-
tification for the denial of guaranteed rights. Specifically, the
approach provides the court with a mechanism to justify the
limitation of employment opportunities because of biological
difference. This is accomplished through the recognition of a
potential fetus's right not to be harmed, which is placed above
the right of a woman to make decisions about paid work and
46. Id. at 896-98.
47. Id. at 886. The test is not compatible with a substantive equality
approach and is not reflective of the intent of Title VII. Even if such a test
were so compatible and reflective, the result reached in this case does not
balance the rights of the employee against the rights of the employer and the
unborn child. The rights of the employees, in this case, fertile women, are
not even acknowledged let alone balanced. The Seventh Circuit recognizes
the right of potential fetuses to be protected from harm and a right in the
employer to act as their protector. These rights are recognized to the
exclusion of a women's right to make decisions about paid work and
procreation.
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reproduction. Moreover, and what is most troubling about the
Seventh Circuit's decision, is that women do not even have the
right to choose not to become pregnant and work in a higher
paid but dangerous job. That choice was taken away from
women by the court and vested in the employer, who is given
the right to decide that all fertile women can be excluded from
certain jobs. Women are left with the choice to become sterile,
which is a choice no one should have to make.
That the balancing test approach is inconsistent with the
intent and language of Title VII and the PDA is a point clearly
made by the Supreme Court. The Court reached the conclu-
sion that the fetal protection policy directly discriminates
against women on the basis of sex, 48 and that an employer may
only justify such a policy by proving that it is a BFOQ. In this
case, the employer was unable to establish that the policy was a
BFOQ.
Looking first to the general provision against sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII, the Supreme Court concludes that fetal
protection policies directly discriminate on the basis of sex and
these policies exclude women from certain jobs because of
childbearing capacity, rather than excluding any employee,
male or female, on the basis of fertility. 49
Moreover, the Court concludes that the PDA supports
their finding because the policy "explicitly classifies on the
basis of potential for pregnancy ... ."50 TheJustices spend lit-
tle time on this point because simply put, the PDA is clear that
differentiation "because of or on the basis of pregnancy" is dis-
crimination on the basis of sex.5
However, it is the interpretation by the Supreme Court of
the intent of Title VII which is the clearest rejection by the Jus-
tices of the balancing test adopted by the appellate court:
Concern for a woman's existing or potential offspring
historically has been the excuse for denying women equal
employment opportunities. It is no more appropriate for
the court than it is for individual employers to decide
whether a woman's reproductive role is more important
48. The concurrence as well as Justice Scalia are in agreement with the
majority on this point.
49. The Court did not see the evidence as conclusively supporting that
only a woman's exposure to lead could lead to birth abnormalities. The
Court refers to the evidence in the record about a man's exposure to lead as:
"debilitating." UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., I I l S. Ct. 1196, 1203 (1991).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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to herself and her family than her economic role. Con-
gress has left this choice to the woman as hers to make.
5 2
As was the case in Guerra, the Supreme Court does not set
out a broad definition of discrimination as did the Supreme
Court in Canada, nor does it state that it is adopting and apply-
ing a substantive equality approach to the issue before it. How-
ever, in my opinion, a broad definition of discrimination and a
substantive equality analysis underlie the result reached by the
Court. Recognizing the right of women to make choices about
paid work and reproduction can only be supported if women
are viewed as biologically different, but not inferior to men
because of this difference. Furthermore, biological difference
is not relied upon to disentitle women to employment opportu-
nities. Instead, the Court's approach is consistent with the
adoption of a broad definition of gender which includes the
unique ability to conceive. This characteristic of women
becomes a valid component in the determination of whether
the policy discriminates and whether it can be justified as a
BFOQ.
In addition to establishing the beginnings of a substantive
equality framework in which to assess issues about reproduc-
tion and employment, the Supreme Court acknowledges that it
is the societal treatment, and specifically the legal treatment of
biological difference, rather than biological difference itself,
which is the root of gender inequality. The Court explicitly
states that biological difference has been used as a ready excuse
to deny women equal employment.5 " Moreover, by not adopt-
ing the appellate court's approach to the resolution of many of
the issues in the case, there is an implicit rejection by the
Supreme Court of the nature theory, as well as at least three of
the stereotypical attitudes which flow from the theory.
The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court, that
women have the right to make decisions about paid work and
reproduction free from court and employer input, could not
have been reached if the court accepted the stereotype that
52. Id. at 1210. Judges Easterbrook and Flaum, in their dissenting
opinion in the Seventh Circuit, stated the same:
No legal or ethical principle compels or allows Johnson to assume
that women are less able than men to make intelligent decisions
about the welfare of the next generation, that the interests of the
next generation always trump the interests of living women, and that
the only acceptable level of risk is zero. '[Tihe purpose of Title VII
is to allow the individual woman to make that choice for herself!.
Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 913 (Easterbrook & Flaum, JJ., dissenting).
53. See Johnson Controls, Ill S. Ct. at 1202-04.
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women are less able than men, and according to the appellate
court, less able than employers, to make independent sound
decisions. The appellate court allowed an employer to decide
to exclude women from potentially hazardous jobs without any
input from the women employees who were the individuals
directly affected by such a decision. Since this finding cannot
be justified on a legal basis, 54 it is reasonable to assume that the
decision was influenced by the belief that women are less capa-
ble decisionmakers than others.
The Seventh Circuit opinion also contains other examples
which demonstrate the way in which this belief, as well as the
belief that women are primary caregivers and secondary wage
earners, impacted upon the decision of the appellate court.
The Supreme Court does not rely upon these beliefs, and the
resolution of the issues by the Court demonstrates this. A com-
parison of the way in which each of these courts identifies and
articulates the interests or rights of the parties involved is one
example which illustrates the different approaches adopted by
the two courts.
The appellate court viewed the case as one in which three
interests were at issue. The first interest is that of a potential
fetus to be born free of defects. The second is the interest of
the employer to act as a protector of the first interest and the
third, is the right of women to pursue paid employment for
'financial reward'. 5
Limiting women's equal paid work opportunities to only
one of the components of such opportunities, that is financial
reward, demonstrates that the appellate court views women as
secondary wage earners, as workers who provide a supplement
income to a primary male wage earner. It becomes very clear
that this is the view of the court when Judge Coffey says:
The status of women in America has changed both in the
family and in the economic system. Since they have
become a force in the workplace as well as in the home
because of their desire to better the family's station in
life, it would not be improbable that a female employee
might somehow rationally discount this clear risk in her
54. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
55. Discussing the first and third of these interests, Judge Coffee says:
These concerns are particularly important in a case of this nature
where the interest in financial reward is balanced against a medically
established risk of the birth of a medically or physically deprived
baby and where the challenged distinction is based upon the reality
that only the female of the human species is capable of childbearing.
Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 883.
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hope and belief that her infant would not be adversely
affected from lead exposure. The unborn child has no
opportunity to avoid this grave danger, but bears the def-
inite risk of suffering permanent consequences.5 6
Characterizing women as secondary wage earners desiring
to 'better the family's station in life' is a stereotypical general-
ization without factual merit. There are many reasons why
women participate in the paid workplace and most often the
reason is financial necessity5" not financial betterment which
seems to be what the appellate court is suggesting.
It is also a characterization which is without legal merit
because it is inconsistent with the intent of Title VII. Title VII
provides women with the right to equal employment opportu-
nities regardless of the reason which motivates them to pursue
paid work. The statute does not require a woman to establish
grounds for seeking paid employment to trigger the applica-
tion of the act.
The belief that women are not capable independent deci-
sionmakers is also present in the appellate court's analysis.
Judge Coffey's comment that "it would not be improbable that
a female employee might somehow rationally discount this
clear risk . 5.8."" appears to be based on this belief. Giving the
employer the right to determine when to exclude women from
certain hazardous jobs, makes clear that the court does not
think that the employer will fall victim to the same irrational
thought.
It is the operation and influence of these assumptions that
lead the appellate court to interpret the PDA as providing for a
right to equal employment opportunities which is properly lim-
ited on the basis of procreative distinctions. An analysis free
from the influence of these assumptions results in a very differ-
ent articulation of the interests involved in the case as the
Supreme Court judgment demonstrates.
To identify the interests at issue in this case, the Supreme
Court begins with the premise that women, not the court, and
certainly not employers, are to be the decisionmakers where
paid employment and procreation choices present themselves.
As a result, the Court does not recognize three interests. It
acknowledges only the rights of women to equal employment
opportunities and to reproductive choice. The Court does not
limit the right to equal employment opportunities because of
56. Id. at 897.
57. See supra notes 9 and 31.
58. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 888.
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biological difference. The interest of women is properly stated
as the right to make choices about reproduction and employ-
ment free from employer and court interference. The freedom
to decide these issues takes precedence over the right of poten-
tial fetusses as well as the employer's interest, unless the
employer can justify those interests as a BFOQon the basis of
established law.59
A second example of the impact of stereotypical general-
izations about women, paid work, and reproduction on the
appellate court's decision lies in its determination that the
employer could establish a BFOQ In interpreting that part of
the BFOQ test which requires the employer to establish that all
or substantially all women are unable to safely and efficiently
perform the excludedcjobs, the appellate court states that "the
very womanhood ... of the employee undermines .. .her
capacity to perform a*job satisfactorily."'6
By "womanhood," the Seventh Circuit is referring to a
woman's ability to conceive and bear children. The appellate
court discusses this concept at some length concluding that the
BFOQ requirement is a recognition by Congress of the realistic
physical differences between men and women-that is the very
womanhood of women and the very manhood of men.
Consistent with a formal equality analysis, this interpreta-
tion of the BFOQ requirement allows for equality of employ-
ment only when women are similarly situated to men.
However, when women are not so situated, because of their
unique role in the procreative cycle, equality of condition does
not follow.
To support this analysis, the appellate court attempts to
draw a distinction between the real physical differences
between men and women and stereotypical characterizations
about the sexes. The appellate court acknowledges that laws or
standards based upon stereotypical assumptions are not justifi-
able BFOQ's.6 1 However, a careful examination of the distinc-
tion the Court attempts to draw from a substantive equality
perspective reveals that it is a distinction without a difference.
The nature theory and stereotypical characterizations about
women are based upon the physical biological difference of
women. Thus, to accept the court's distinction is to accept that
biological difference is a valid basis upon which to distinguish
59. Johnson Controls, 11I S. Ct. at 1210. I agree with the majority of the
Court that a fetal protection policy cannot be justified as a BFOQ.
60. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 898.
61. Id. at 894.
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and it is also to accept the stereotypical generalizations which
followed from this difference.
The Supreme Court does not specifically address the dis-
tinction drawn by the appellate court however, as discussed
earlier, the determination by the Supreme Court that women
are free to make decisions about paid work and reproduction is
inconsistent with the nature theory and thus with the basic
premise of the appellate court's argument.
By setting out the parameters of a substantive equality
framework which includes the rejection of the nature theory
the Supreme Court has taken a significant step towards the
realization of substantive equality for women in cases about
employment and reproduction. However, as was the case in
Brooks and Guerra, this step alone cannot guarantee such equal-
ity. The remedy to redress the discrimination must also result
in actual equality of condition and unfortunately, the remedy in
this case does not.
The choice which the Court guarantees will only result in
substantive equality of condition for women in toxic work-
places if it is a real choice and not an illusory one. The choice
can be illusory in at least two ways.
First, the obligation of the employer to provide women
with the necessary information to make an informed and mean-
ingful decision about whether to work in potentially hazardous
conditions must be enforced by the courts.6" An informed
choice can only be made if a fertile woman is aware and under-
stands the most up to date information about the risks associ-
ated with the hazardousjob. Although the Court states that the
employer may not avoid its obligation to "police the work-
place" for safety,6" they do not discuss the obligations of an
employer under "Right to Know" Laws. Emphasizing the
employer obligation to inform would make the choice provided
by the Supreme Court as real as possible.'
62. See, e.g., Employees' Right to Know Law, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.58
(West 1990) (applies to any toxic substance which is regulated under the
federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration); cf. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1025 (1991) (regulating lead exposure in the industry). The Right to
Know Law requires the employer, on employee request, to provide the
employee with information which discloses "[a]ny symptom or effect of
infection ...... WIs. STAT. ANN. § 101.585(l)(C) (West 1990).
63. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209.
64. Even the most current medical documentation may not reveal every
possible risk and, because of this reality, the employer cannot be expected to
provide a zero risk workplace.
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Sending a clear message to employers that right to know
legislation will be enforced will benefit all employees. Johnson
Controls did not exclude fertile men from hazardous jobs even
though there was some evidence to indicate that lead exposure
did have an effect on the reproductive process in men.65 The
appellate court dismissed this evidence as "speculative and
inconclusive" because it was animal research evidence. 66 The
Supreme Court did not dismiss the evidence and found that the
employer should have excluded workers from hazardous jobs
on the basis of fertility rather than on the basis of sex.6 7
Emphasizing the employer's obligation to provide information
on reproductive hazards for women in turn implies a like obli-
gation on employers to provide the same information to men.
The result can only be a safer workplace for women and men
alike.
Second, the choice can be illusory because the court did
not require the employer to continue its current practice of
providing fertile women with the option of performing less
dangerous jobs without a loss in pay or benefits.6" In this way,
the decision does not guarantee women equality of economic
condition. A woman choosing not to work in a high risk posi-
tion because of potential reproductive hazards will be economi-
cally penalized if the only alternativejob she is offered pays less
money and or offers less attractive benefits, such as a smaller
pension or less seniority. In this case, the choice whether to
work in a high risk position only provides access to such jobs
and this is a remedy which is consistent with a formalistic per-
spective; women have access to the same jobs as men do. How-
ever, if for reproductive reasons a woman moves to a less
dangerous job which does not provide the same economic ben-
efits as the more hazardous job, economic inequality follows.
The overall effect of the remedy in these circumstances is the
perpetuation of the historical disadvantaged status of women in
society.
V. CONCLUSION
Procreation benefits society in an obvious and fundamen-
tal way. It is for this reason that society encourages women to
65. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1203.
66. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 889.
67. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1203.
68. Under the policy, fertile women were transferred to less dangerous
jobs without suffering a loss in wages or benefits. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at
889 n.28.
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procreate. But, when women procreate and subsequently
become nurturers and caregivers to our children, society
denies them the rights of other citizens. The nature theory and
stereotypical assumptions about women have become
entrenched into our laws resulting in the devaluing of women
as individual citizens.
Women are prevented from fully participating in society
because the law does not support their claim to full citizenship.
Laws that deny women social justice because of their unique
role in the procreative cycle serve only to perpetuate the disad-
vantaged status of women in society. The legal treatment of
reproduction and employment rights demonstrates this.
Women are economically and socially penalized for procreat-
ing and this inequality perpetuates the existing unequal status
of women in our society. It is for this reason that the legal
treatment of reproductive capacity plays a critical role in the
task of eliminating inequality.
Under both constitutional and antidiscrimination law, the
concept of substantive equality demands an examination of the
impact of the law on the actual condition of individual women
as conceivers and as a disadvantaged group in our society.
Facially neutral laws and those that limit a woman's participa-
tion in society through a differentiation analysis based on bio-
logical determinism will not result in equality of condition for
women.
Women have the ability to benefit society through their
unique procreative role. Whether an individual woman
chooses to benefit society in this way should not be relevant to
the determination of her legal rights. What is relevant, is that
conception is a characteristic shared by all women, an integral
characteristic that affects the actual condition of women in our
society.
The right of women to participate equally in the paid work-
place should not be limited because of the unique ability to
conceive. Such an approach places an unjustifiable limitation
on a woman's right to equal opportunities in the paid work-
place and on the right to reproduce. The courts must ensure
that each of these rights is given equal weight. In situations
where a choice between these rights may present itself, that
choice must always be left with the woman to make.
The substantive equality approach which is being devel-
oped and applied in both Canada and the United States is a
significant step towards the realization of equality of condition
for women. Application of such a model to the determination
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of whether policies and laws discriminate on the basis of sex
and specifically on the basis of pregnancy, has produced more
just results for women. However, equality of condition has not
followed from these findings of sex discrimination. The reme-
dies fashioned to redress the discrimination have not addressed
the problem of actual inequality of condition. Remedies which
account for the fact that women have been, and continue to be
disadvantaged in our society because of biological difference,
are critical to the realization of equality of condition for women
in our society.

